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THE PROBLEM OF RELIEF IN
DEVELOPER-INITIATED EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING LITIGATION
JOHN M. HYSON*
The Pennsylvania and New Jersey courts are now entering the second
phase of exclusionary zoning litigation. Having set forth (however
imprecisely) the substantive law of exclusionary zoning,I the courts are
now beginning to face the more practical and important issue-the relief
to be granted once an ordinance has been determined to be
exclusionary.
The problem of appropriate judicial relief can arise in two different
contexts because two fundamentally different kinds of relief may be
sought by the challengers of exclusionary zoning ordinances: (1) refor-
mation of a municipality's zoning ordinance to eliminate its exclusion-
ary aspects, and (2) the authorization to carry out a particular develop-
ment on a particular parcel of land. The former type of relief is sought
primarily in litigation initiated by nonresidents of the exclusionary
* Professor of Law, Villanova University. A.B., Boston College, 1963; M.A.,
University of North Carolina, 1964; LL.B., Harvard University, 1967.
I. See Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 466
(1975); Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustments, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The landmark New Jersey decision is Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975). Accord, Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d
236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
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municipality. 2 The latter (which shall be referred to as "site-specific
relief") is sought in developer-initiated cases.
The courts have neither confronted nor always recognized the dif-
ficult conceptual and practical problems which hinder a court's ability to
grant appropriate relief in a developer-initiated case. Any judicial
attempt to formulate site-specific relief must first confront the question
whether the courts have the power to grant such relief. If it is deter-
mined that the courts do have such power, it is still necessary for the
courts to recognize that, in formulating site-specific relief, they must
balance two competing social interests: the economic interests of the
developer, who often is the only one who can effectively attack
exclusionary zoning in a municipality, and the interests of the munici-
pality in rational and planned community growth. The problem of relief
in nonresident litigation will be examined briefly in order to provide a
background for the discussion of the problem of relief in developer-
initiated cases.
I. NONRESIDENT-INITIATED LITIGATION
As already indicated, the relief sought in a nonresident suit can be
expected to differ considerably from the relief sought in a developer
suit. The developer who initiates an exclusionary zoning challenge is
interested only in receiving permission to proceed with his development
on his parcel of land-site-specific relief. Though the developer's exclu-
sionary challenge may be directed at the entire zoning ordinance of the
municipality, once he receives site-specific relief he is not concerned
with whether the municipality's zoning ordinance continues to be
exclusionary. On the other hand, the nonresident is usually not
interested in a particular parcel of land. He seeks broader relief, the
amendment of the entire zoning ordinance, so that land will become
available for low and moderate income housing. The specific location of
that land is of no particular interest to the nonresident; he wishes only an
opportunity to live somewhere in the exclusionary municipality.
The nonspecific nature of the relief sought by the nonresident may
make judicial resolution of his challenge difficult. The threshold prob-
lem is one of access to the courts. In Warth v. Seldin,3 the United States
2. Such relief can be sought by any person who has an interest in eliminating a
municipality's exclusionary zoning practices but who has no interest in the development
of a particular parcel of land within the municipality. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975), plaintiff challengers included nonresident persons of low and moderate income, an
adjoining municipality's taxpayers, an association of homebuilders, and a corporation
interested in the development of low and moderate income housing.
3. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING RELIEF
Supreme Court dismissed a federal court challenge to an exclusionary
zoning scheme because the nonresident plaintiffs lacked standing.4 One
of the bases for the Warth decision was the Court's concern about the
efficacy of relief which does not involve construction of housing on a
specific site.5 While Warth did not completely close the federal courts to
nonresident-initiated exclusionary zoning litigation, 6 the Court did
make clear that such litigation would usually not be entertained unless it
focused upon a particular project so that a court might grant effective
relief-i.e., order the approval of that project.'
Though Warth v. Seldin, on its facts, is limited to nonresident
exclusionary litigation in federal courts, its impact on nonresident state
court litigation could be substantial. The Court stated that its discussion
of standing involved "both constitutional limitations on federal court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." 8 The constitu-
tional limitations (the "case or controversy" requirement of article III
of the United States Constitution) are clearly inapplicable to state court
litigation. The prudential limitations, however, are relevant to state
court litigation and can be expected to influence nonresident litigation in
state courts.
Even before the decision in Warth, Pennsylvania courts refused to
entertain nonresident exclusionary zoning litigation. In Commonwealth
v. County of Bucks,9 the Commonwealth Court" dismissed an action in
which nonresidents challenged the validity of the zoning ordinances of
all fifty-four townships in Bucks County. The court rejected plaintiffs'
far-reaching request for relief "of an ongoing and continuing nature""
4. Id.
5. Id. at 516-17.
6. SeeNote, Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an
Exclusionary Zoning Scheme, II URBAN L. ANN. 223 (1976).
7. 422 U.S. at 516-17.
8. Id. at 498.
9. 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
10. The Commonwealth Court is an intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over
zoning appeals.
1!. 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 179, 180 (C.P. 1972), also reported in 302 A.2d 897, * ,9
(1973).
In order to meet and resolve the problems posed by plaintiffs in their presently
hypothetical, far-ranging and totally unparticularized context, the Court itself,
directly, or indirectly through the requested mandates to and oversight of the County
planning commission and the governing bodies of the fifty-four separate
municipalities, would be required to assume the awesome task of becoming a super-
planning agency, with no expertise in the field; and as such the Court would be
required to make immediate and basic 'initial policy considerations of a kind clearly
1976]
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against the respective municipalities, the county planning commission,
the county housing authority, and the county.12 County of Bucks accu-
rately reflects the real basis for the result in Warth-the reluctance of
the judiciary to fashion and implement the necessary relief should the
court decide in favor of the nonresident challenger on the merits. The
fashioning of effective relief in nonresident litigation not only burdens
the courts, requiring retention of jurisdiction in order to supervise the
municipality's correction of the invalid ordinance, but also requires
judicial "intrusion" into areas which have traditionally been viewed as
the domain of local legislative bodies. Warth thus can be viewed as an
attempt by the Court to avoid "government by injunction."13
In New Jersey, a nonresident may challenge an exclusionary zoning
ordinance, 14 but the state supreme court has thus far skirted the problem
of relief. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel 5 the majority cautiously declined to say how far it might go in
fashioning a remedy, declaring only that certain aspects of the town-
ship's ordinance were invalid 16 and hinting at further relief should it be
necessary.17 If Mount Laurel adopts amendments which do not cure the
for non-judicial discretion'; and to carry out this tremendous responsibility with an
entire 'lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it'
... . This responsibility we do not believe we are required to assume, and we
therefore decline to do so.
Id. at 188, also reported in 302 A.2d at 904-05, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
12. 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 180-81, also reported in 302 A.2d at 899-900.
13. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40: 55-47.1 (Supp. 1973) (confers standing upon "other
interested persons"). Cf. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 159 n.3, 336 A.2d 713, 717 n.3, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). In
most other jurisdictions, standing is accorded only to an "aggrieved person" and that
phrase is interpreted to apply only to those with property interests which are adversely
affected by the allegedly exclusionary ordinance. See Note, Beyond Invalidation: The
Judicial Powerto Zone, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 159, 160 (1975). After the commencement of the
nonresident challenge in County of Bucks, the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
(the state zoning enabling legislation) was amended to specifically provide that standing to
challenge the validity of an ordinance is limited to landowners and "persons aggrieved by a
use or development permitted on the land of another." Act of June i, 1972, §§ 1001, 1004,
1005, [1972] Pa. Laws 333, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11001, 11004, 11005 (1972). A trial
court has ruled that a nonresident is not a person aggrieved. Lightcap v. Wrightstown
Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 25 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 145 (C.P. 1974), aff'd per curiain by the
Commonwealth Court in an unreported opinion.
15. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
16. See id. at 209-17, 336 A.2d at 743-47 (Pashman, J., concurring).
17. It is not appropriate at this time. . . to deal with the matter of the further extent
of judicial power in the field or to exercise any such power. . . . The municipality
should first have full opportunity to itself act without judicial supervision. We trust
[Vol. 12:21
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invalidity of its zoning ordinance, will the court grant further relief or
will the court give the township another opportunity to amend its ordi-
nance? Will the availability of such an opportunity depend upon
whether the township is perceived to be acting in "good faith"?
Just how far a court will intrude into the legislative domain when it
entertains a nonresident challenge is suggested by Pascack Association
v. Mayor & Council of Township of Washington, 18 a developer-initiated
challenge. On December 20, 1972, the court held that the township's
zoning ordinance was invalid because, among other things, it failed to
make any provision for multi-family housing, the type of development
proposed by the challenger. 9 In entering judgment on January 12, 1973,
the court emphasized that it was not going to order the adoption of
specific zoning provisions.2" On January 29, 1973, the township
amended its ordinance establishing a multi-family district consisting of
approximately 34 acres. The challenger contended that this action did
not constitute compliance with the court's judgment. 2' After some pro-
cedural maneuvering, the court held a hearing on October 4, 1973. At the
conclusion of the hearing the court held that "the township had been
afforded sufficient opportunity to comply with the judgment of January
12, 1973 ;"22 in other words, the court was not going to give the township
another opportunity to amend its ordinance so as to comply with the
January 12th judgment. In addition, the court appointed planning con-
sultants who were to report to the court on whether the township's
action constituted compliance with the January 12th judgment. If the
consultants concluded that there had not been compliance, they were to
recommend a zoning plan and zoning controls for the township which
that it will do so in the spirit we have suggested, both by appropriate zoning ordinance
amendments and whatever additional action encouraging the fulfillment of its fair
share of the regional need for low and moderate income housing may be indicated as
necessary and advisable.
67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734 (emphasis added).
18. 131 N.J. Super. 195, 329 A.2d 89 (L. Div. 1974), rev'd, No. A-3790-72, A-1841-73
(App. Div. 1975).
19. Id. at 197, 329 A.2d at 91.
20. [lit is not the province of the court to specify zoning densities or to exercise any
other control at this juncture over the manner in which the township must meet its
obligation to provide for multi-family or rental-type housing within its borders.
Obviously, in view of the township's state of development, the range of choices
available to it is limited, but these choices are properly a function of the legislative
power which it must exercise with reasonable promptness and in accordance with the
requirements of the statute.
Id. at 198, 329 A.2d at 91 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 200, 329 A.2d at 92.
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would carry out the terms of the judgment. On January 19, 1974, the
consultants reported that the township's actions did not constitute com-
pliance with the court's judgment; in addition, they submitted the
requested zoning plan and controls.' Since the consultants had con-
cluded that the challenger's land was appropriate for multi-family
development, the court ordered the township to permit such develop-
ment on the challenger's land.24
In retrospect, Pascack is an easy case. Since it was initiated by a
developer, the ultimate relief granted by the court need only address
itself to the developer's land.' But what if Pascack had been non-
resident-initiated? Would the court have ordered the township to adopt
the zoning controls which had been recommended by the court-
appointed consultants?26 This seems to be suggested by the reference to
Pascack in Mount Laurel.27 If a township is ordered to adopt an ordi-
nance recommended by court-appointed experts and declines to do so,
what are the options available to the court? Is it realistic to suppose that
the court would hold the township governing body in contempt? Is it
feasible to suggest that the court might by-pass the township governing
body and take over zoning administration in the township? Finally,
would it be conscionable for the court to attempt to enforce compliance
by enjoining the enforcement of all township zoning restrictions until
the township adopts a valid zoning ordinance?28
23. Id. at 201, 329 A.2d at 93. See Levin & Rose, Suburban Land Use War: Skirmish in
Washington Township, I MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 507 (R. Scott ed. 1975)
(description of process used by the consultants in making their decisions).
24. 131 N.J. Super. at 208, 329 A.2d at 97.
25. The developer who challenges an exclusionary zoning ordinance is interested only
in site-specific relief and may, in fact, favor the continuation of an exclusionary zoning
ordinance in order to exclude potential competing developers.
26. In Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council of the Borough
of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Ch. 1976), the court invalidated the zoning
ordinances of 23 of the 25 municipalities of Middlesex County and ordered each of these
municipalities to undertake various activities which, in the court's view, would insure that
each municipality would accommodate its "fair share" of low and moderate income
housing. The court (apparently without the assistance of a planning consultant) computed
the number of units of low and moderate income housing which each municipality must
accommodate in order to meet its "fair share" obligation. The court held that it was not
enough for the municipalities to simply rezone so as not to exclude the possibility of low
and moderate income housing in the allocated amounts. The court also ordered each
municipality to undertake affirmative action, including an order to "pursue and cooperate
in federal and state subsidy programs for new housing and rehabilitation of substandard
housing." Id. at -, 359 A.2d at 542. The court did not indicate what it would'do if the
municipalities did not comply with its order.
27. 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
28. See Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exchsionary Zoning,
74 MICH. L. REV. 760 (1976).
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These difficult questions will eventually have to be faced by the New
Jersey Supreme Court.2 9 It would be surprising if the court were not
somewhat chastened by its experience in Robinson v. Cahill3 where,
after holding the state system of financing education to be unconstitu-
tional, 3' it was forced to close the state's public schools in order to
enforce its judgment. 32 Though the state legislature finally capitulated
by adopting an income tax,33 the strain created by this confrontation
between the judicial and legislative branches suggests that the court may
move slowly in attempting to implement the substantive holding of
Mount Laurel.
II. DEVELOPER-INITIATED LITIGATION
In developer-initiated cases the challenger seeks relief only as to his
specific site. Though not as far-ranging as the relief sought in nonresi-
dent litigation, site-specific relief does present several problems. First,
it is not entirely clear that courts have the power to grant even this
29. These questions may be faced when the court renders its decision in the longstand-
ing Madison Township litigation. This litigation is a developer-initiated challenge to the
township's zoning ordinance. In October 1971, Judge Furman of the Superior Court
declared that the township's ordinance was invalid. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971). The state supreme court
granted review. 62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972). The township then amended its ordi-
nance and the supreme court remanded the matter to Judge Furman for consideration of
the amended ordinance. In early 1974, Judge Furman decided that the amended ordinance
was still invalid. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438,
320 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1974). In January 1976, the supreme court heard oral argument for
the fourth time and took the matter under advisement. Prior to the most recent argument,
the supreme court submitted 18 questions to be briefed by the parties. Among them were
the following:
II. If the Court affirms the determination of the trial court that the ordinance, as
amended, still does not affirmatively provide adequately for low or moderate income
housing, how specific should the court be as to the terms of an ordinance which will
satisfy Mt. Laurel? Do the interests of bringing this litigation to a final determination
dictate some degree of specificity in the determination of the Court?
12. In connection with the latter question, would it be serviceable for the Court to
appoint a Special Master to consult with the municipality and frame specific zoning
guidelines to assist the municipality in meeting the Court's judgment?
Letter to Parties, Sept. 25, 1975. If the court addresses these questions in its decision, it
will certainly clarify the New Jersey law with respect to relief in exclusionary zoning
litigation.
30. The opinions and orders of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Robinson
litigation are reported at 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973);
67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975); 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975); 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129
(1976); 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
31. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
32. 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
33. New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act, Laws 1976, c. 47, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54A:1-1
to :9-27 (West Sess. Law Serv. 1976, No. 2).
19761
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limited form of relief. Assuming that courts do have such power, the
practical problem remains of determining what circumstances warrant
site-specific relief. Limited use of site-specific relief may discourage
developer-initiated litigation, particularly if the court permits the munic-
ipality to cure its defective ordinance through an amendment that does
not benefit the developer. On the other hand, if courts are generous in
granting site-specific relief to a successful developer-challenger-by
ordering that he be permitted to proceed with his proposed develop-
ment-they may impose upon the municipality a highly irrational and
even harmful pattern of development.3 4
The Pennsylvania courts have considered the problem of whether a
court should grant site-specific relief to a developer who has success-
fully challenged a municipality's zoning ordinanceY5 The Pennsylvania
decisions will be considered in examining the following questions: (1) If
a municipality amends its zoning ordinance after the developer has
initiated his challenge, must the court consider such amendment in
ruling upon the validity of the municipality's zoning ordinance? (2) If a
court determines that a municipality's zoning ordinance is invalid, does
the court have the power to order site-specific relief to the developer?
(3) If a court determines that a municipality's zoning ordinance is invalid
and if the court has the power to order site-specific relief, under what
circumstances should such relief be ordered?
A. The Relevance of the Post-Challenge Amendment
The problem of the post-challenge amendment was presented to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board.6 Less
than two months after the court had held another municipality's zoning
ordinance invalid because it made no provision for apartments, 37 a
developer challenged the zoning ordinance of Warwick Township on the
same ground.3" Shortly after the commencement of the developer's
challenge, the municipality amended its ordinance to create an apart-
ment district and rezoned certain property to this new classification. 39
34. See Williams, Doughty, & Potter, Exclusionary Zoning Strategies: Effective
Lawsuit Goals and Criteria, I MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 477, 485-87 (R.
Scott ed. 1975).
35. The principal decisions are Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., - Pa. -,328 A.2d 464
(1974), and Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
36. - Pa. -, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
37. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
38. - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 465.
39. Id. at -, 328 A.2d at 466.
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The rezoning, however, did not include the property of the
developer-challenger.40
If a post-challenge amendment must be considered by a court when it
rules upon the merits of the challenge, the developer's task becomes
difficult. He must shift his attack from the original ordinance to the
amended ordinance. The developer has only two alternatives, both
equally unattractive. First, he can continue to contend that the ordi-
nance is exclusionary by asserting, for example, that the amended
ordinance does not provide for the municipality's "fair share" of apart-
ment development. 41 Such a contention will presumably require that the
developer produce extensive and sophisticated evidence of housing
demand in the municipality. The cost of prosecuting such a challenge
will be great, with little assurance of success, since the applicable
substantive law is unclear. Alternatively, the developer can drop his
exclusionary challenge and contend that the municipality's ordinance is
invalid as applied to his property on one of the traditional grounds-
arbitrariness or confiscation. Such grounds are difficult to establish
because the amended ordinance enjoys a presumption of validity.
Judicial consideration of a post-challenge amendment in ruling upon
the merits will discourage developer challenges. No developer will
initiate a challenge if its only effect will be to make someone else's land
available for high-density development. If a jurisdiction refuses to
consider nonresident challenges, discouraging developer challenges
effectively discourages all challenges and leaves little incentive for a
municipality to amend its exclusionary zoning ordinance.
These considerations apparently influenced the Pennsylvania Sup-
reme Court in Casey when it decided whether the post-challenge amend-
ment must be considered in ruling upon the merits of the developer's
challenge. In reaching its decision, the court took the Pennsylvania
"pending ordinance" doctrine, 42 applied it to a totally different situa-
tion, and held that, in considering the developer's challenge, it would
look at the municipality's ordinance as it existed at the time of the
challenge and would not consider the subsequent amendment since it
40. Id.
41 Such a contention would be grounded upon Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale
Farms, Inc., - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
42. - Pa. at , 328 A.2d at 467. The Pennsylvania "pending ordinance" doctrine
provides that a permit may be denied if, on the date when an application for a building
permit is filed, there has been public declaration of a pending ordinance which would, if
adopted, require the denial of the permit. Id. Many of the decisions applying this doctrine
are collected in Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, I Pa. Cmwlth. 55,275 A.2d 406 (1970), aff'd, 445
Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744 (1971).
19761
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was not "pending" at the time of the challenge.4 3 The court's "reason-
ing" is set forth as follows:
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a building permit
may be refused if at the time of application for such permit there is
pending an amendment to a previously permissive zoning ordi-
nance which is sought. . . .When there has been a 'sufficient
public declaration' of an intent to amend the existing zoning ordi-
nance, it is the pending amendment which governs the issuance of
such permits. . . . While the facts presented herein distinguish the
instant case from the typical 'pending ordinance' case, in that there
existed no permissive zoning ordinance subsequently amended to
effectively deny the application for the building permit, the same
approach will be followed.4
The court goes on to conclude that, since there had not been "sufficient
public declaration" by the municipality of an intent to amend its ordi-
nance at the time of the developer's challenge, the amendment need not
be considered. 45
1. Judicial Power to Disregard a Post-Challenge Amendment
Had the court in Casey examined the differences between the
"typical"pending ordinance situation and the situation which it had
before it, it is unlikely that the court would have reached the result
which it did. In the "typical" situation, application of the pending
ordinance doctrine does not infringe in any way upon the municipality's
zoning power; on the contrary, the doctrine was formulated in order to
insure that such power could not be frustrated. In the typical situation a
developer has submitted an application for a building permit which is
consistent with the existing zoning but which is inconsistent with a
proposed amendment to the municipality's zoning ordinance. Since the
pending ordinance doctrine provides that a municipality may not deny a
permit under such circumstances unless there has been "sufficient
public declaration" of the proposed amendment, the doctrine might be
viewed as a device designed to protect a developer's right to a building
permit. But the right to receive a building permit is not equivalent to the
right to develop in accordance with the permit. Since Pennsylvania law
provides that there can be no vested right to develop in accordance with
existing zoning unless there have been both good faith expenditures and
the issuance of a valid permit,46 the pending ordinance doctrine is a
43. - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 466-67.
44. Id.
45. Id. at -, 328 A.2d at 467.
46. Gulf Oil v. Township Bd. of Supervisors, 438 Pa. 457, 266 A.2d 84 (1970). An
earlier decision, Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301,247 A.2d 572 (1968), appears
[Vol. 12:21
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doctrine designed to protect a municipality against the establishment of
vested rights which would be inconsistent with publicly declared pend-
ing amendments to the municipality's zoning ordinance.
The court's application of the pending ordinance doctrine to the
Casey situation does, however, constitute an infringement upon the
municipality's zoning power. The court's application of the doctrine to
the Casey situation purports to authorize a court to disregard a post-
challenge amendment to the municipality's zoning ordinance. The court
refers to no authority in support of the proposition that a court may, in
ruling upon the validity of a challenged ordinance and in granting
relief,47 disregard the fact that the challenged ordinance has been
amended. 4
to suggest that the acquisition of a permit, in and of itself, confers a vested right to develop
in accordance with the terms of the permit. See 73 DICK. L. REv. 578 (1969). However,
Gallagher may be viewed as a case of "special legislation"-that is, the court refused to
deny the landowner's right to develop in accordance with his permit because the munici-
pality's post-permit zoning amendment was intended to frustrate the landowner's plans
for development. Cf. Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, reportedin 275 A.2d 406,410 (C.P. Beaver
County), aff'd, I Pa. Cmwlth. 55, 275 A.2d 406 (1970), affl'd, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744
(1971). See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13 (1973).
47. Strictly speaking, the court's application of the pending ordinance doctrine to the
Casey situation dealt only with the propriety of considering the post-challenge amendment
in ruling upon the merits of the developer's challenge; it did not deal with the propriety of
considering the post-challenge amendment in determining whether, after the merits have
been decided in favor of the challenger, the challenger should receive site-specific relief.
Common sense, however, dictates that if the post-challenge amendment is ignored when
the court rules upon the merits of the challenge, it must also be ignored when the court
considers whether to grant site-specific relief. The result in Caseyindicates thatthe court,
in applying the pending ordinance doctrine, intended that the post-challenge amendment
was to be ignored not only when the court ruled upon the merits of the challenge but also
when the court determined whether to grant site-specific relief.
48. In the Madison Township litigation (see note 29 supra), the Supreme Court of New
Jersey apparently assumed that it had no power to disregard a post-challenge amendment.
After a lower court had ordered that the township's ordinance was invalid and the supreme
court had granted review, the township amended its ordinance. The supreme court then
remanded the matter to the lower court for consideration of the validity of the amended
ordinance.
There is a rather cryptic suggestion in Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth.
404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975), that the Casey holding was modified by the 1972 amendments to
the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11001-11011
(1972) (state zoning enabling legislation). The 1972 amendments established new proce-
dures for litigating challenges to zoning ordinances. A challenger is given the option of
submitting his challenge either to the zoning hearing board or to the governing body. If the
challenger chooses to submit his challenge to the governing body, he is required to submit
a request for a "curative amendment." SeeRosenzweig, The Curative Amendment Proce-
dure in Pennsylvania: The Landowner's Challenge to the Substantive Validity of Zoning
Restrictions, 80 DICK. L. Rav. 43 (1975). Naturally, a challenger will request a curative
amendment which, if adopted, would rezone his property. See Henszey & Novak, Sub-
stantive Validity Challenges Under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code: The
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2. Policy Considerations Relating to the Effect Which Should Be
Given to a Post-Challenge Amendment
In the previous section, consideration was given to the question
whether a court has the power to disregard a post-challenge amendment
in ruling upon the merits of the challenge. Though it has been argued that
the Casey decision was incorrect in assuming the existence of such
power, it is clear that such power could be conferred upon the courts by
the state legislature. Since a municipality is not a sovereign but only a
created subdivision of the sovereign state, its legislative power is not
plenary. It has only such legislative power as has been delegated to it by
the state. Therefore, the state legislature could provide that a court, in
ruling upon the merits of a challenge, could disregard any post-challenge
amendment. The present section will consider whether such a provision
would be desirable-whether, in other words, the result in Casey makes
sense.
The policy considerations which influenced the Casey decision can be
found in the court's response to the municipality's contention that the
state zoning enabling legislation compelled the court to give considera-
tion to the post-challenge amendment. The legislation provided that,
where there has been a challenge to the validity of an ordinance, a court
has the power to declare the ordinance invalid and also has the power to
"[s]tay the effect of its judgment for a limited time to give the local
Practitioner and the New Procedures, 21 VILL. L. REV. 187 (1976); Wolffe, Procedures
Under the Municipalities Planning Code, 14 DuQuESNE L. REV. 1 (1975). In Ellick, the
court (while not faced with the issue) recognized that problems might arise if the governing
body adopted a curative amendment other than that suggested by the challenger.
If the governing body determines that its ordinance is defective, it may amend the
ordinance by accepting the proposed curative amendment, or a variation thereof.
While recognizing the potential problems which may thus arise, we do not decide in
this case what happens if the governing body adopts a curative amendment different
from the one which was proposed by the landowner. We are quite certain, however,
that the 1972 amendments to the MPC do not in any way interfere with the governing
body's power to amend its zoning ordinance in a manner which the governing body
believes will best further legally the public interest. To reiterate, if it finds that its
ordinance is defective, the governing body may choose to cure the defect by an
amendment other than that proposed by the challenging landowner. However, we
must caution governing bodies that they cannot adopt or pass a curative amendment
which would frustrate the challenging landowner, as was attempted in the Girsh case,
supra. Seethe recent opinion of our Supreme Court in Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board
of Warwick Township, - Pa. -, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 411, 333 A.2d at 244.
The reference to Casey seems to limit (if not negate) the court's earlier statement that a
municipality may adopt a post-challenge curative amendment which differs from that
sought by the challenger.
Since the procedures established by the 1972 amendments do not clearly overturn the
holding in Casey, it must be assumed that a Pennsylvania court in ruling upon a developer's
challenge need not consider a post-challenge curative amendment which differs from that
sought by the challenger.
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governing body an opportunity to modify or amend the ordinance or
map in accordance with the opinion of the court." 49 The township
contended that since this provision granted the municipality the oppor-
tunity to cure an ordinance deficiency after judgment, a fortiori it may
be given the opportunity to cure the deficiency before judgment. 50
The court rejected the township's argument by rejecting its
premise-that th6 state legislation required that a township be given an
opportunity to cure a defective ordinance after judgment. 51 In refusing
to so interpret the legislation, the court argued:
To so read the legislative intent would effectively grant the munici-
pality a power to prevent any challenger from obtaining meaningful
relief after a successful attack on a zoning ordinance. The munici-
pality could penalize the successful challenger by enacting an
amendatory ordinance designed to cure the constitutional infir-
mity, but also designed to zone around the challenger. Faced with
such an obstacle to relief, few would undertake the time and
expense necessary to have a zoning ordinance declared
unconstitutional. 5
2
The court also stated that to allow a municipality to correct a defective
ordinance after judgment by zoning around a successful challenger
would be inconsistent with its ultimate disposition of Girsh Appeal.5 3 In
Girsh, after the municipal zoning ordinance was successfully challenged
by a developer, the municipality amended its ordinance without includ-
ing the developer's land. 54 The developer returned to the supreme court
with a "petition for enforcement" of its previous decision. In a cryptic
order which contained no explanatory rationale, the court granted the
petition.55 The missing explanation came in Caseywhen the court stated
that its final disposition of Girsh indicated a recognition "that an appli-
cant, successful in having a zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional,
should not be frustrated in his quest for relief by a retributory
township." 56
The court's references in Casey to the state legislation and its ultimate
disposition of Girsh are interesting but inapposite. The court failed to
49. Act of July 31, 1968. § 1009 [19681 Pa. Laws 845. This provision wasdeleted from
the Municipalities Planning Code by the 1972 amendments. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
11001-11011 (1972).
50. - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 468.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at , 328 A.2d at 469.
54. Id. at , 328 A.2d at 468.
55. Order No. MP-12, 271 (Aug. 29, 1972) (unpublished).
56. - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 468.
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perceive the distinction between pre- and post-judgment amendments.
Both the state legislation and Girsh involved post-judgment amend-
ments. Casey involved pre-judgment amendments, amendments
enacted after the challenge but beforethe case goes to judgment. Even if
it is sound policy to deny to a municipality the right to zone around a
challenger after judgment in favor of the challenger, as in Girsh, it does
not follow that it is sound policy to deny to a municipality the right to
zone around the challenger before judgment, as in Casey.
Arguably, these two situations should be treated differently. Once
there has been a judgment that an ordinance is invalid, the municipality
should not be able to zone around the challenger because of the substan-
tial time and expense incurred by the challenger in bringing his challenge
to development. The Casey court was correct in asserting that if the
municipality were given a free hand to zone around the challenger after
judgment, "few would undertake the time and expense necessary to
have a zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional. ' 57 On the other
hand, when the municipality amends its ordinance in response to the
challenge but before the case goes to court, the challenger has not yet
been subjected to the expense of litigation. The developer may have to
abandon his challenge (if he feels that the amendment cures the
exclusionary defect)58 or change the theory underlying his challenge (if
he feels that the amended ordinance is still invalid on exclusionary
grounds). But if the cost of commencing a challenge is not prohibitive59
and if the municipality's amendment is enacted within a short period of
time after the challenge is commenced, the developer who abandons his
challenge as a result of the amendment will not have incurred substantial
expense and the developer who changes the theory of his challenge will
not have invested a substantial amount of effort in the discarded theory.
In addition, there are substantial arguments in support of giving
consideration to a post-challenge amendment. The substantive law of
exclusionary zoning is in a state of development. The Pennsylvania
courts, in particular, are constantly establishing new standards for
declaring municipal ordinances to be exclusionary. 60 A municipality
57. Id. at -, 328 A.2d at 468.
58. Of course, even if the developer believes that the amendment has cured the
exclusionary defect, he can still challenge the amended ordinance on the more traditional
grounds of arbitrariness or confiscation.
59. One of the purposes of the 1972 amendments to the Municipalities Planning Code
was to simplify the procedures and reduce the expense of prosecuting challenges to
municipal zoning ordinances. See Rosenzweig, The Curative Amendment Procedure in
Pennsylvania, supra note 48, at 44.
60. See note I supra. The Commonwealth Court has also held that a zoning ordinance is
invalid if it makes no provision for townhouses. Camp Hill Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of
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which is attempting in good faith to meet its obligations under the
substantive law of exclusionary zoning must regularly amend its ordi-
nance in response to judicial decisions. For such amendments to be
sound as a matter of policy, they will often have to be preceded by
weeks (or months) of planning. If post-challenge amendments are not to
be considered by the courts, the opportunistic developer will race to
challenge a municipality's ordinance immediately after a change in the
substantive law of exclusionary zoning. Disregarding post-challenge
amendments and granting site-specific relief may upset rational plan-
ning.6 ' The municipality will be denied the opportunity to choose where
and how it wishes to meet its obligations under the substantive law of
exclusionary zoning.
6 2
Adjustment, 13 Pa. Cmwlth. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974). The same court has suggested that a
zoning ordinance is invalid if it makes no provision for "fourplex units." Kaufman &
Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 116, 340 A.2d 909 (1975). These
decisions indicate that the Commonwealth Court interprets Girsh to require that a zoning
ordinance contain some provision for every "'valid" use. One group of commentators has
contrasted this "Pennsylvania rationale" with the "sensible rationale" of the New Jersey
courts. Williams, Doughty & Potter, supra note 32, at 485-87.
61. See Williams, Doughty & Potter, supra note 32, at 485-87.
62. One municipality in Bucks County, Buckingham Township, reacted to develop-
mental pressures and the Girsh decision by undertaking a lengthy course of planning which
was designed to produce land use controls which would satisfy the township's obligations
under the Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning decisions but which would also preserve the
township's rural amenities. The township contemplated, among other things, a limited
"'development district," extensive open space zoning, and the use of transferable
development rights. While this planning process was going on, the township's effective
zoning ordinance was clearly invalid under Girsh since it made no provision for apart-
ments. When the apparent boundaries of the development district became known-but
before there was "public declaration" of an amendment to the zoning ordinance-eight
challenges to the existing zoning ordinance were instituted by persons who owned land
outside of the area which was being considered for the development district. The township
governing body denied the requests of these landowners for curative amendments and the
landowners sought judicial review.
On October 23, 1976, the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County handed down its
decision. Schlanger v. Board v. Supervisors of Buckingham Twp. No. 75-2561-08-5 (C.P.
1976). Relying on the Casey decision (among others), the court held that an amendment
enacted after the commencement of the eight challenges was not "pending" at the time of
commencement and therefore could not be considered in ruling upon the merits of the
eight challenges. Since the township acknowledged that the zoning ordinance in effect at
the time of commencement was exclusionary, the court decided the merits in favor of the
challengers. In accordance with § 1011 of the 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972) (seenote 81 infra), the
court referred all elements of the challengers' plans for development to the township's
governing body "in order that this body may restudy them in the existing record and
formulate reasonable restrictions which will be subject to review in this court." Schlanger
v. Board of Supervisors of Buckingham Twp., No. 75-2561-08-5, slip op. at 7 (C.P. 1976).
The court gave no guidance to the governing body on the question as to what restrictions
would be considered to be "reasonable." See notes 82-98 and accompanying text infra.
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Casey thus goes too far in favoring the challenger over the municipal-
ity. A municipality should be given a reasonable period of time within
which to respond to decisions which change the law of exclusionary
zoning. Post-challenge amendments should be considered if they have
been enacted in "good faith," that is, if the amendments have been
enacted within a reasonable period of time after the articulation of the
substantive law which is the basis for the developer's challenge. 63
This proposed solution" obviously lacks the clarity and simplicity of
the Casey "pending ordinance" approach. But the adverse conse-
quences of the Casey approach far outweigh any advantages in simplic-
ity of application. Under the proposed solution, a developer would be
required to give a municipality a reasonable period of time within which
to react to a new declaration of substantive law. If, in the opinion of the
developer, that period of time passes and the municipality has not
amended its ordinance, the developer can then initiate his challenge. If
the municipality thereafter amends its ordinance, the municipality
should bear the burden of proving that the amendment was in "good
faith." Should the municipality meet this burden of proof, the developer
A newspaper account of this decision states that the plans of the successful challengers
call for 9,000 housing units and that, if these units were developed and occupied, the
township's population would quadruple (from 7,500 to 30,000). Philadelphia Inquirer,
Nov. 1, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 2. Needless to say, the township plans to appeal. But, absurd as
it may seem, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas seems to follow logically from
Casey.
63. This view was espoused by Chief Justice Jones in his dissent in Casey:
[U]ntil today, I believe a lower court could consider the prompt, good faith efforts of a
township to bring its zoning ordinance into compliance with the unconstitutionality
[sic] cited in Girsh and, where such a good faith amendment was adopted prior to
court proceedings, the trial court would be permitted to dismiss the challenging
landowner's complaint. Although the majority refers to the affirmative relief granted
in Girsh as mandating similar relief here, it must be noted that in Girsh the 'curative'
amendment was adopted over three and a half months after this court's decision and
more than a year after the landowner's initial challenge. Furthermore, when this court
decided to grant specific relief to the landowner in Girsh (order dated August 29,
1972), the issue was whether a township could in 'bad faith' zone around the challeng-
ing landowner. The issue of bad faith was not presented here.
- Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 470-71 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
What constitutes a "reasonable period of time" will vary depending upon the nature and
complexity of the planning response which is necessitated by a particular declaration of
substantive law. Where the substantive law requires that a municipality provide for a "fair
share" of apartment development, it may be reasonable for a municipality to take a
substantial period of time in calculating the prospective demand for apartments within the
municipality and in determining the appropriate location for such apartment development.
64. Since under present zoning enabling legislation a court has no power to disregard a
post-challenge amendment (see notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra) the effectua-
tion of this solution would require that state zoning enabling legislation be amended to
provide that in ruling upon developer-initiated challenges, a court need consider only the
original ordinance and "good faith" amendments.
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would have to shift his attack to the amended ordinance or abandon his
challenge.
65
B. Judicial Power to Grant Site-Specific Relief
The second major concern relating to relief in developer-initiated
exclusionary zoning litigation is the question of the court's power to
grant site-specific relief in the absence of legislation specifically confer-
ring such power upon the courts. Conceptually, the issue is whether the
granting of site-specific relief by a court infringes upon the legislative
rights and prerogatives of the municipality. 66
The issue can arise in several factual contexts. In Casey, for example,
the municipality responded to the developer's challenge by amending its
ordinance to provide for apartment development on land other than that
owned by the challenger. In adopting such an amendment, it must be
presumed that the municipality made an objective policy or legislative
judgment that it would be in the best interest of the municipality to have
apartment development in a particular geographic area.67 Even if this
amended ordinance may be disregarded by the court when it rules upon
the merits of the developer's challenge, the question remains whether
the court has the power to disregard the amendment in granting relief . 8
65. This approach assumes a situation where there has been an authoritative appellate
court decision which constitutes a new declaration of substantive law. It attempts to deal
with developer challenges which are commenced shortly after such a decision. Thus, this
approach is not designed to deal with the situation where a developer challenges a
municipality's ordinance on novel grounds. Since the challenger's grounds for attacking
the municipality's ordinance are novel, it is unlikely that the municipality will adopt a
post-challenge "curative" amendment for it will not be clear that there is any defect which
must be cured.
66. This issue can be looked at in two ways: (I) whether a court has the power to grant
site-specific relief after a declaration of invalidity, or (2) whether a municipality has the
right to amend its ordinance after a judicial declaration of invalidity.
67. It could be argued that when a municipality, shortly after the commencement of a
developer's challenge, amends its ordinance in a way that does not benefit the challenger,
it should be presumed from these facts alone that the amendment was not the product of an
objective determination of the public welfare by the municipality but rather was an act of
retribution against the challenger. If such a view were adopted, the burden would be on the
municipality to rebut this presumption. Even though such a reversal of the usual presump-
tion of validity has been adopted under some circumstances in exclusionary zoning
decisions (see, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 180-81, 336 A.2d 713,728, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)), it would not bea
proper way to deal with the post-challenge amendment. In view of the large number of
exclusionary zoning decisions, a municipality acting in good faith needs time to plan
before amending its ordinance in response to such decisions and thus might not adopt an
amendment until after a challenge has been commenced. In addition, there may be many
valid planning reasons supporting a municipality's decision to deny high-density zoning to
a challenger.
68. These two questions are quite similar and it would obviously make no sense for a
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The issue of a court's power to grant site-specific relief can also arise
when there has been no amendment to the challenged ordinance. In
Girsh, for example, the court declared the municipality's ordinance to
be invalid because it made no provision for apartments.6 9 May the court
go on to grant site-specific relief to the challenger-by requiring that he
be permitted to pursue his proposed apartment development-without
giving the municipality an opportunity to amend its ordinance and
thereby indicate where it wishes to have apartment development? Even
if it could be argued that a court may order that a successful challenger
be allowed to proceed with apartment development, may the court deny
to the municipality an opportunity to impose non-locational (e.g.,
density, set-back) restrictions on apartment development?
The courts seem to recognize the problem of judicial encroachment
upon municipal legislative power when a developer-challenger seeks, in
addition to a declaration of invalidity, an order compelling the defending
municipality to rezone the developer's land so as to permit his proposed
development. Most courts still view zoning as a legislative act and a
judicial order compelling rezoning is thus viewed as a blatant infringe-
ment of the municipality's legislative power.70 A developer-challenger
court to disregard a post-challenge amendment in ruling upon the merits of a developer's
challenge and then, having declared the original ordinance invalid, to hold that the
amendment limits the availability of site-specific relief. See note 47 supra. Nonetheless,
the question of a court's power to disregard a post-challenge amendment in ruling upon the
merits of a developer's challenge and the question of a court's power to disregard a
post-challenge amendment in granting site-specific relief are conceptually distinct ques-
tions. Indeed, it appears that § 1011 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972), confers the latter power upon Pennsylvania courts but
not the former.
69. 437 Pa. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396.
70. There are an increasing number of exceptions to this general rule as courts in many
jurisdictions come to distinguish between legislative and administrative (or quasi-judicial)
rezonings. The initial decisions set aside rezonings which failed to satisfy quasi-judicial
standards. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574,507 P.2d 23 (1973).
See generally Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 130 (1972). More recent decisions have taken the next logical
step-judicial orders requiring specific rezonings. This position has been adopted in a
trilogy of plurality opinions by three members of the Michigan Supreme Court, Nickola
v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975); Sabo v. Township of
Monroe, 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975); Smookler v. Township of Wheatfield, 394
Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975). See Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an
Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Act: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MIcH. L.
REv. 1341 (1975). The courts of Illinois have long been willing to enter orders requiring
municipalities to rezone specific land. See generally Note, Beyond Invalidation: Judicial
Power to Zone, supra note 14, at 162-64.
Pennsylvania adheres to the traditional view of zoning as a legislative act. Indeed,
though § 1011 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
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may subtly avoid the problem by requesting an injunction against the
enforcement of any ordinance which is inconsistent with his proposed
development rather than a rezoning. For example, in City of Richmond
v. Randall,71 the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the Illinois
approach of compulsory rezoning. 72 "We believe these holdings [of the
Illinois court], which compel affirmative action by legislative bodies, go
too far. The injunction is a more traditional remedy and one less offen-
sive to the concept of separation of powers." 73
It is difficult ot see how the approach of the Virginia court is "less
offensive to the concept of separation of powers" than the Illinois
approach. The difference between the two approaches is more semantic
than real. A court order requiring apartment zoning of a particular parcel
of land (the Illinois approach) denies the municipality the power to
determine whether apartment development should take place on that
parcel of land. An order prohibiting the municipality from enforcing any
ordinance which would prevent apartment development on a particular
parcel of land (the Virginia approach) also denies the municipality the
power to determine whether apartment development should take place
on that parcel of land. Assuming that the power to determine the
location of particular uses is a legislative power of the municipality, both
the Illinois and Virginia approaches constitute equal encroachments
upon that power.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has authorized site-
specific relief, it has never set forth the authority for granting such
relief. In Girsh the court apparently suggested to the municipality that it
could amend its ordinance by providing for apartment development on
land other than that owr. -d by the successful challenger, 74 but when the
municipality took such action, the developer was able to obtain site-
specific relief. 75
11011 (1972), clearly authorizes a court to grant site-specific relief, the Commonwealth
Court has stressed that a court has no authority to order a rezoning. Ellick v. Board of
Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 415, 333 A.2d 239, 246 (1975).
71. 215 Va. 506, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975).
72. The leading Illinois decision is Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19
I11. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 (1960).
73. 215 Va. at 513 n.3, 211 S.E.2d at 61 n.3. The kind of injunction contemplated by the
court is a "decree enjoining the legislative body from taking any action which would
disallow the one use shown to be reasonable. . . .[the challenger's proposed use]." Id.
74. 437 Pa. at 246 n.6, 263 A.2d at 399 n.6:
[Alppellee [the municipality] could show that apartments are not appropriate on the
site where appellant wished to build, but that question is not before us so long as the
zoning ordinance is fatally defective on its face. Appellee could properly decide that
apartments are more appropriate in one part of the Township than in another but it
cannot decide that apartments can fit in no part of the Township.
(emphasis in original).
75, Order No. MP-12, 271 (Aug. 29, 1972) (unpublished).
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In Casey, after invalidating the municipality's ordinance, the court
turned to the question "whether a court has the power to grant an
applicant-challenger definitive relief upon rendering a zoning ordinance
constitutionally infirm." 76 The court's treatment of the issue was less
than incisive. In effect, the court said that definitive relief may be
granted (1) because Girsh permits such relief (without explaining why),
and (2) because it would be unwise not to allow definitive relief.77
Neither ground confronts the issue of judicial infringement upon the
legislative power of the municipality.
The problem of whether site-specific relief interferes with the munici-
pality's legislative prerogative could be easily resolved if statutory
support could be found for the proposition that such a prerogative does
not include the right to rezone a challenger's land after there has been a
successful challenge.7' Since a municipality is merely a created subdivi-
sion of the sovereign state, its legislative power is limited and defined by
state legislation. Therefore, state zoning enabling legislation could
validly deny to a municipality the right to rezone a successful challeng-
er's land. 79 Section 10111 of the 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania
76. - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 469.
77. The appellee seeks a building permit for the erection of multi-family dwellings on
his tract of land located in Warwich Township. This Court, pursuant to its disposition
of the petition for enforcement of our order in Girsh Appeal has implicitly held that
courts in this Commonwealth do have such power. "Obviously, if judicial review of
local zoning action is to result in anything more than a farce, the courts must be
prepared to go beyond mere invalidation and grant definitive relief." (Krasnowiecki,
Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedure, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029,
1082 (1972)] To forsake a challenger's reasonable development plans after all the
time, effort and capital invested in such a challenge is grossly inequitable.
Id.
78. Professor Jan Z. Krasnowiecki has argued persuasively that, as a matter of policy,
a municipality should not be able to rezone a successful challenger's land. Krasnowiecki,
Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedure, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1060-65
(1972). He points out that a municipality which loses an exclusionary challenge "has had
one bite at the apple"--that is, it has had a chance to enact a valid zoning ordinance. And,
writing before the decision in Casey, Professor Krasnowiecki goes on to say: "if it [the
municipality] felt so strongly about the other possible uses [for which it might wish to zone
the challenger's land], it could have amended its ordinance during the course of the legal
proceedings, thus forcing the landowner to contend with its preferred alternative." Id. at
1064. Though these arguments are persuasive on policy grounds, Professor Krasnowiecki
does not cite statutory support for the proposition that a municipality does not have the
right to rezone a successful challenger's land.
79. This assertion may be subject to qualification in states which have conferred home
rule powers upon their municipalities. See generally I R.ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING §§ 3.04-3.08 (1968). In Pennsylvania, it is clear that the Home Rule Act does not
confer upon municipalities any zoning power in excess of that conferred by the
Municipalities Planning Code, the specific zoning enabling legislation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 1-302(a)(10) (1972).
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Municipalities Planning Code8° is an example of such legislation, in that
it clearly confers upon the Pennsylvania courts the power to grant
site-specific relief to a successful challenger. 81
C. The Circumstances Under Which Site-Specific
Relief Should Be Granted
Once it has been determined that a court may grant site-specific relief
in developer-initiated exclusionary zoning litigation, it is still necessary
to consider the circumstances under which such relief should be
granted. It is again appropriate to focus upon policy considerations even
though such considerations are in conflict. Any relief granted must
provide an incentive for a developer-challenger by holding out hope that
a successful challenge will entitle him to site-specific relief. At the same
time such relief must protect the defendant municipality against the
challenger's development if such development is inconsistent with
rational planning or harmful to the environment.
Though section 1 10 11 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code clearly confers upon the Pennsylvania courts the power to grant
site-specific relief, it gives the courts little guidance as to when, and to
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11011 (1972).
81. Id. § 11011:
(I) In a zoning appeal the court shall have power to declare any ordinance or map
invalid and to set aside or modify any action, decision or order of the governing body,
agency or officer of the municipality brought up on appeal.
(2) If the court finds that an ordinance or map or a decision or order thereunder
which has been brought up for review unlawfully prevents or restricts a development
or use which has been described by the landowner through plans and other materials
submitted to the governing body, agency or officer of the municipality whose action
or failure to act is in question on the appeal, it may order the described development
or use approved as to all elements or it may order it approved as to some elements and
refer other elements to the governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction
thereof for further proceedings, including the adoption of alternative restrictions, in
accordance with the court's opinion and order. The court shall retain jurisdiction of
the appeal during the pendency of any such further proceedings and may, upon
motion of the landowner, issue such supplementary orders as it deems necessary to
protect the rights of the landowner as declared in its opinion and order.
In order to understand the effect of § 110 11(2), one must be familiar with one additional
aspect of ihe new procedure for zoning challenges which was established by the 1972
amendments. A challenge must be accompanied by a description of the development
which the challenger proposes to undertake if he is successful in his challenge. Id. §
11004(2)(c). This description is set forth in "plans and other materials," which, under §
11011(2). become a focal point when the court decides upon the nature of the relief which it
will grant to the successful challenger.
Thus, § 11011(2) clearly denies to a municipality the right to zone around a successful
challenger. Viewed another way, § 11011(2) clearly confers upon the Pennsylvania courts
the power to grant site-specific relief to a successful challenger.
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what extent, such relief should be granted.82 Section 11011 describes a
number of options which are available to a court once it has ruled in
favor of a developer's challenge but it does not describe the circum-
stances under which a court should use a particular option.
In Ellick v. Board of Supervisors3 the Commonwealth Court inter-
preted section 11011 for the first time.84 The court established a reason-
ableness standard: "It would be grossly inequitable to reject a success-
ful challenger's reasonable development, considering the time and
effort which must be invested in such a challenge.' '85 But the reason-
ableness standard, in and of itself, provides little guidance .86 The follow-
ing discussion will attempt to set forth a more precise standard.
1. Compliance with Existing Unchallenged Restrictions
When a court has determined that a particular aspect of a zoning
ordinance is invalid, it would be inappropriate for the court to order that
the challenger be allowed to proceed with his development without
giving the municipality an opportunity to determine whether the pro-
posed development complies with unchallenged (and presumptively
82. Id. § 1101 1(2):
[The court] may order the described development or use approved as to all
elements or it may order it approved as to some elements and refer other elements to
the governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction thereof for further proceed-
ings, including the adoption of alternative restrictions, in accordance with the court's
opinion and order. The court shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal during the pend-
ency of any such further proceedings and may, upon motion of the landowner, issue
such supplementary orders as it deems necessary to protect the rights of the land-
owner as declared in its opinion and order.
83. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
84. More recent decisions of the Commonwealth Court add little, by way of explana.
tion, to the discussion in Ellick. See, e.g., Gorski v. Township of Skippack, 19 Pa. Cmwlth.
346, 339 A.2d 624 (1975); Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Cmwith. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet been called upon to interpret § 11011.
85. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 415, 333 A.2d at 246.
86. In Ellick, the court went beyond a simple statement of the "reasonableness" tesi
and attempted to give more specific guidance to courts when they must consider whether.
and to what extent, to grant site-specific relief. Id. at 416-17, 333 A.2d at 247.
[W]e believe the function of the court is to pass upon the reasonableness of the
restrictions present in the record, including both the restrictions contained in the
landowner's plans and the restrictions present in the ordinance which are applicable
to the same class of usage or construction. If the court finds that none of the
restrictions present in the record are reasonable, then we believe the proper course
would be to remand to the governing body for the formulation of reasonable restric-
tions, which would then be subject to review. In carrying out its responsibilities, the
courts of common pleas may order the landowner's plans, or portions of them, to be
approved subject to the otherwise legal zoning regulations in the ordinance (which has
been found to be defective), which may be applicable to the same class of usage or
construction.
Id.
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valid) non-zoning restrictions which were in existence at the time the
challenge was commenced.87
There may also be unchallenged zoning restrictions which a success-
ful challenger should be required to meet. For example, a developer
might challenge a municipality's zoning ordinance on the ground that the
amount of land zoned for apartment use is insufficient to satisfy the
municipality's "fair share" obligation. If the challenger is successful,
the municipality should nevertheless be given the opportunity to deter-
mine whether the challenger's proposed development meets the appli-
cable unchallenged aspects of the municipality's zoning ordinance which
were in existence at the time of the challenge.88 The court may disregard
the municipality's land use restrictions only if, and to the extent that, the
court has determined them to be invalid. 89
For a successful challenger to be entitled to site-specific relief, it is
necessary that his development comply with unchallenged restrictions,
87, See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., - Pa. -, -, 328 A.2d 464, 469 (1974):
IWle are not justified in ordering the immediate issuance of this building permit when
the right thereto is conditioned on other prior approvals which have not been given.
We cannot say that the appellee is entitled to the building permit, as a matter of right,
upon successful challenge to the zoning ordinance. Rather, he must satisfy the
requirements of the other sources of control (i.e., subdivision controls, building
codes, etc.) before such permit may issue.
88. This general situation is presented under the facts of Township of Willistown v.
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - Pa. -, 341 A.2d466 (1975). The Pennsylvania court ruled that
the township's zoning ordinance was invalid "in that it does not provide for a fair share of
the township acreage for apartment construction." -Pa. at., 341 A.2d at468. The court
went on to grant the following relief:
We direct that zoning approval for appellee's tract of land be granted and that a
building permit be issued given appellee's compliance with the administrative reqdire-
ments of the zoning ordinance and other reasonable controls, including building,
subdivision, and sewerage regulations, which are consistent with this opinion.
Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 468-69.
The court's language (especially its reference to "zoning approval") is less thanprecise
and left both the developer and the township uncertain as to the relief to which the
developer was entitled. The developer has taken the position that, if it complies with all
applicable non-zoning restrictions, it is entitled to a building permit which would allow
apartment construction at the density set forth in its plans. The township, on the other
hand, contends that the developer is subject to the more restrictive density limitations for
apartment construction which are contained in the township's ordinance. Interview with
Lawrence E. Wood, attorney for Chesterdale Farms, Inc., and Robert J. Shenkin, attor-
ney for the Township of Willistown.
89. Section 11011 and the Ellick decision are ambiguous on this point. Section 11011
empowers a court to order the challenger's development "approved as to all elements."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972). The language should not be construed as authority
to order approval of those elements which are not in compliance with unchallenged
existing restrictions. So also, the court in Ellick stated that it is "the function of the court
to pass upon the reasonableness of the restrictions present in therecord." 17 Pa. Cmwlth.
at 416, 333 A.2d at 247. This language should not be viewed as authorization for acourt to
pass upon the "reasonableness" of existing restrictions which have not been challenged.
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but compliance with such restrictions may not be sufficient to entitle the
challenger to site-specific relief. Several Pennsylvania decisions sug-
gest that compliance with zoning and non-zoning restrictions in effect at
the time of the developer's challenge is sufficient to entitle the chal-
lenger to site-specific relief, 90 but such a per-se rule, although simple to
apply,9' will not produce desirable results in all cases.
First, such a rule does not require compliance with restrictions which
were not in existence at the time of the challenge but which were part of
a "good faith" post-challenge amendment. If such an amendment has
been adopted by the municipality, a successful challenger should not
receive site-specific relief which is inconsistent with the unchallenged
aspects of that amendment.
Second, such a rule fails to deal sensibly with the situation in which
the successful challenger seeks to undertake high-density development
on land that is unsuitable for such development. Suppose, for example,
that the land in Casey had been zoned for low-density agricultural uses
and constituted a major aquifer recharge area. The per se rule cannot be
interpreted as requiring compliance with the userestriction which was in
effect at the time of the challenge because, if it did, there would never be
any developer challenges. 92 A developer would never challenge a zoning
ordinance if he could not expect to use his land in a way which differed
from the use permitted at the time of his challenge. On the other hand,
the successful challenger should not always be permitted to proceed
90. In Casey itself, the court directed that "the building permits applied for be issued
upon compliance by appellee with all administrative requirements of the zoning ordinance
in effect on the date of the original application which are not inconsistent with this
opinion." - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 469-70 (emphasis added). In the Chesterdale Farms
decision the majority did not direct themselves to this specific issue but Justice Roberts, in
a concurring opinion, stated that: "[A]ppellee is entitled to a building permit upon
compliance with 'all administrative requirements [e.g. subdivision controls, building
codes, etc.] of the zoning ordinance in effect on the date of the original application' which
are not unconstitutional. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board, - Pa. -, 328 A.2d 464, 469-70
(1974)." - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 471.
91. All that would be necessary would be for the court to remand in order to give the
appropriate agency an opportunity to determine whether the challenger's development
complied with the existing restriction. If the agency determined that there had not been
compliance, the court (having retained jurisdiction) could review the determination.
Disputes as to the issue of compliance would probably be infrequent and would not
present complex issues for judicial review.
92. In Pennsylvania, at least, it is clear that a developer who initiates exclusionary
zoning litigation need not challenge the zoning ordinance as it applies to his property. His
challenge is to the entire zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., -Pa.
- - n.l1, 328 A.2d 464, 468 n.l1 (1974). Therefore, it could be argued that the use
restriction applicable to a challenger's property is an unchallenged existing restriction
which should limit any site-specific relief granted to the challenger.
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with his proposed use when such use might cause environmental harm.
Third, the existing restrictions rule fails to deal with the situation in
which high-density use of the developer's land might be suitable but
certain aspects of the developer's plans are unreasonable. Suppose, for
example, that the developer in Casey had plans for apartment develop-
ment which called for a density of 40 units per acre. It might be reason-
able for the developer's land to be developed at a density of 20 units per
acre but must the developer be allowed to develop at the higher density
specified in his plans simply because there were no existing density
restrictions for apartment uses at the time he commenced his challenge?
These not uncommon situations demonstrate that a challenger's pro-
posed development should not always be considered to be "reason-
able" simply because it complies with existing restrictions. 93 A more
sophisticated standard of reasonableness is necessary.
2. Defining the Standard of Reasonableness
If the existing restrictions rule is inadequate, there are a number of
alternative ways to determine whether a successful challenger's
development is "reasonable."
First, the municipality could be given the opportunity, after its ordi-
nance has been determined to be invalid, to adopt new restrictions
which would be applicable to the challenger's proposed development
and which would enjoy the usual presumption of validity. The chal-
lenger would have the opportunity to prove that such new restrictions
are not "reasonable" because they are exclusionary, arbitrary or
confiscatory.
Second, the municipality could be given the opportunity to adopt new
restrictions which would be applicable to the challenger's development
but such new restrictions would not enjoy the above presumption.
Rather, the court would be required to make a de novo determination
that such restrictions were "reasonable." In making this determination,
the court would take into account the various considerations which
underlie the adoption of land use restrictions-the topography of the
developer's land, the availability of public water and sewerage, the
nature of abutting roads, to name a few.
Third, the court itself could determine whether the challenger's plans
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972) contemplates that there may be circum-
stances in which a court, in fashioning site-specific relief, should go beyond existing
restrictions and refer the matter to the appropriate municipal agency for the "adoption of
alternative restrictions."
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for development are "reasonable." This approach would actually
require two reasonableness determinations: whether high-density
development on the challenger's land is reasonable and, if so, whether
the sites selected by the challenger are reasonable. The former determi-
nation would require the court to consider the proximity of the challeng-
er's land to schools and other public facilities, the availability of public
water and sewers, the adequacy of abutting roads to handle additional
traffic, and various other matters.
Fourth, the court itself could focus upon the challenger's plans for
development, as above, and determine whether the plans are "reason-
able" solely in terms of their potential environmental impact. The
developer's plans would be "reasonable" if they would not cause sub-
stantial environmental damage.
The first and second approaches give the municipality an opportunity
to adopt new restrictions which would then be subject to judicial review.
Certainly, providing the municipality with an opportunity to adopt new
restrictions makes sense when the municipality has no restrictions
which are applicable to the kind of development proposed by the chal-
lenger. Such is the situation when a municipality's ordinance is declared
to be invalid because of its failure to make any provision for a particular
use.
94
On the other hand, once the municipality is given an opportunity to
adopt new restrictions, the likelihood is great that such restrictions will
either prohibit altogether the use contemplated by the challenger (by
zoning land other than the challenger's for such use) or limit certain
aspects of the challenger's proposed development (density, for exam-
ple) more severely than was contemplated by the challenger. In either
situation the challenger will be forced to accept the new restrictions or
seek judicial review. Under the first approach, if the challenger seeks
judicial review he will carry a heavy burden of proof-in effect, he must
institute a new challenge. Under the second approach, there is no
presumption that the new restrictions are valid, but the court is required
to consider factors outside its usual area of competence. Arguably, the
94. In Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975), the
court held that the municipality's ordinance was invalid because it failed to make any
provision for townhouses. However, rather than referring the matter back to the munici-
pality for the adoption of restrictions relating to townhouses (e.g., set-back requirements,
density), the court said that it would be appropriate to subject the challenger's plans to "all
of the other zoning regulations and provisions of the ordinance applicable to residential
usage insofar as they are reasonably adaptable to townhouses." Id. at 417,333 A.2d at 247.
See note 81 supra. It is difficult to conceive how regulations adopted for other forms of
residential usage (e.g., single family) could be "reasonably adaptable to townhouses."
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state legislature could not require the courts to make a de novo determi-
nation of the reasonableness of particular zoning restrictions because
such a determination is not justiciable in character.95
Both the third and fourth approaches deny a municipality the oppor-
tunity to adopt new restrictions and instead require the court to focus
upon the reasonableness of the challenger's plans for development.'
The third approach shares, to some extent, the weakness of the second
in requiring the court to consider matters outside its usual area of
competence. Since the court would be focusing upon the reasonable-
ness of specific plans rather than the reasonableness of new municipal
restrictions, the court's inquiry is more particularized under the third
approach. Nevertheless, the court would still be required to conduct an
extensive and complex inquiry.
The fourth approach-defining reasonableness in terms of the pro-
posed development's environmental impact-would require a court to
determine whether development in accordance with the challenger's
plans would cause substantial environmental damage. This is not an
easy determination but one which courts have long made. 97 Because this
approach increases the likelihood that a successful challenger will
receive site-specific relief, it does not act as a disincentive to developer-
95 There is at least a question as to whether state legislation could validly impose upon
state courts the obligation to make a de novo determination of the "reasonableness" of
provisions in a municipal zoning ordinance. Just as Congress cannot constitutionally
impose upon federal courts the obligation to perform tasks that are outside of the judicial
power, many state constitutions can be interpreted to impose similar restrictions upon
state legislatures. For example, in Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699
(1959), the court held that a provision of a Texas urban renewal law which required a de
novo judicial determination on the question of whether an area was infact a slum violated
the separation of powers provided for in the Texas Constitution by imposing a nonjustici-
able task upon the Texas state courts. See Town of Beloit v. City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d 637,
155 N.W.2d 633 (1968).
96. For a court to apply this approach it would be necessary to require a developer-
challenger to submit his plans for development to the court. There is such a requirement in
Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(c)(1972). For a court to make the kind of
determination which is required under either the third or fourth approach, the submitted
plans would probably have to be more detailed and specific than that which is required
under § 1004(2)(c) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, id. For either of
these approaches to work, a court would have to give a successful challenger an opportu-
nity to draw up detailed plans which would allow the court to make a determination of their
"reasonableness." This is somewhat cumbersome but it probably could be expected that,
in a significant number of cases, the successful challenger and the municipality would be
able to reach an agreement as to the kind of development which the challenger could
undertake and therefore would not impose upon the court the burden of determining
whether the developer's plans are "reasonable."
97. Courts have long been required to make such determinations in private and public
nuisance litigation. See generally D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LANDDEVELOPMENT
L,%w 289-92 (1971).
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challengers. It grants the developer-challenger the maximum relief
which he could reasonably hope to obtain.
If a jurisdiction is going to limit exclusionary challenges to those
which are initiated by developers, it must adopt a policy of site-specific
relief which does not deter such challenges. In addition, such a policy
should not impose upon the courts an obligation to make unduly com-
plex and burdensome determinations. The fourth approach is thus pref-
erable. Arguably this approach is too limited in defining the circum-
stances under which site-specific relief should be denied; it prevents
development which is "harmful" but not that which is "irrational." But
now that the substantive law of exclusionary zoning has been outlined
by the courts, the municipalities are under an obligation to plan and zone
in accordance with that substantive law. If they do so, they should have
no reason to fear developer challenges and "irrational" site-specific
relief.98
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that those courts which have refused to enter-
tain nonresident-initiated exclusionary zoning litigation have done so
because they are reluctant to grant the kind of sophisticated, far-ranging
relief which is sought in such litigation. Fashioning relief may not be as
troublesome in developer-initiated site-specific litigation, but it is not
without difficult conceptual and practical problems.
The Pennsylvania courts-having barred nonresident challenges of
exclusionary zoning ordinances-are now facing and resolving the
problem of relief in developer-initiated litigation. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, however, has imprecisely dealt with the problem of
whether a municipality may "zone around" a developer-challenger-
either before or after a declaration that the municipal ordinance is
invalid. Judicial interpretation of the 1972 amendments to the Pennsyl-
vania Municipalities Planning Code, which clearly empower the courts
to grant site-specific relief to the successful developer-challenger, has
given no clear indication of when and to what extent such relief is
appropriate. Site-specific relief granted on the basis of the environmen-
tal impact of the proposed development would neither burden the courts
with decisionmaking outside judicial competence nor discourage
developer challenges to exclusionary zoning practices.
98. There is no reason for fear if courts give effect to "good faith" amendments by a
municipality in response to new declarations of substantive exclusionary zoning law. If,
however, the Caseyapproach of disregarding such amendments is followed there is a real
danger that the granting of site-specific relief under this fourth approach would bring
about "irrational" development.
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